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The State's Respondent's Brief argues that the District Court correctly applied I.e. § 19-
3501(4) to the facts of this case. Noticeably, however, none of the arguments presented really 
address the specific points made by Appellant Brett J. Jacobson ("Jacobson") in his brief. In any 
event, the State's position is that Jacobson's statutory speedy trial rights were not violated 
because: (a) the cause of the over six month delay was "neutral,,;1 (b) Jacobson did not object to 
the late jury trial setting;2 and (c) Jacobson did not show that he was prejudiced by the delay.3 
As a matter of policy, the State's position effectively eviscerates statutory speedy trial 
law in Idaho. Here, Jacobson twice demanded a speedy trial, never engaged in any waiver of his 
rights, and the State and Court offered no reason as to why they could not fulfill their obligation 
and duty to bring Jacobson to trial within six months. State v. Livas, infra ("The duty to bring a 
defendant to trial lies with the State, not the defendant. The prosecution and the trial court have 
the primary burden to ensure that cases are brought to trial in a timely manner"); See also State v. 
Stuart, infra ("Trial courts must be diligent in securing compliance with time restraints. It is the 
court's duty to arrange for trial"). Instead, the State attempts to shift the blame for the delay to 
Jacobson for not objecting to the late trial setting, despite twice requesting a speedy trial. Under 
the State's theory, the Court and prosecution could fail to bring a suspect to trial in a criminal 
case within six months of his or her not guilty plea, have literally no excuse as to why they could 
1 Respondent's Brief, P. 8. 
2 Respondent's Brief, P. 9. 
3 Respondent's Brief, P. 9. 
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not try the suspect in six months, and avoid I.C. § 19-3501(4) by relying on such malleable 
concepts as "negligence" and "lack of prejudice." 
In short, when a suspect demands a speedy trial on two (2) occasions at the outset of a 
case, and no acts are on record by the suspect that contribute to the delay, only the most 
compelling set of factual circumstances should create the legal justification required to establish 
"good cause." This is especially the case given the rule that when a suspect demands a speedy 
trial, a "stronger reason is necessary to constitute good cause." State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 
260, 16 P .3d 931, 936 (2000) (citations omitted). The facts here are far from compelling. If 
there is no speedy trial violation in this case, there are no speedy trial rights in Idaho. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The reason for the delay was not neutral and even if it was, the Court's error weighs in 
favor of dismissal 
The State argues that the Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal entered by Judge Dane H. 
Watkins should be affirmed, in part, because the reason for the delay was due to an error by the 
Court clerk who entered the trial date from the time of the sworn complaint and not Jacobson's 
first or even second not guilty plea.4 The State's position is that a "data entry error, is a 'neutral' 
reason for delay ... ,,5 This argument lacks merit. 
First, as conceded by the State, even if the reason for the delay is "neutral," this still 
weighs in favor of dismissal. A "neutral" reason does not connote that the reason for delay will 
weigh in neither party's favor. It weighs in favor of the defendant, albeit, to a lesser degree. 
4 Respondent's Brief, P. 8. 
5 Respondent's Brief, P. 8. 
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This issue was thoroughly discussed in State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 160 P.3d 1284 (Ct. App. 
2007). In Lopez, the defendant Lopez was charged with three felonies. Lopez moved the 
District Court for dismissal on constitutional speedy trial grounds. The motion was denied. 
Lopez entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed. 
On appeal, the issue before this Court was whether the trial court correctly applied the 
Barker factors. In addressing this issue, the Court looked to the reason for the delay. !d. at 353-
44, 160 P.3d at 1288-89. The reason proffered was the Court's "overcrowded calendar." !d. at 
354, 160 P.3d at 1289. The lower court found that this reason "was a neutral factor that would 
not be weighed against either party." Our Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed: 
In opposing the motion, the State argued that it was not to blame 
for any of the delay. The district court apparently accepted the 
State's position, holding that the court's overcrowded calendar was 
a neutral factor that would not be weighed against either party. The 
district court erred in this conclusion of law. The duty to bring a 
defendant to trial lies with the State, not the defendant. The 
prosecution and the trial court have the primary burden to 
ensure that cases are brought to trial in a timely manner. The 
United States Supreme Court noted in Barker that although an 
overcrowded court calendar is a 'more neutral' reason for trial 
delay than is a deliberate attempt by the State to delay the trial 
in order to hamper the defense, and therefore should be 
weighed less heavily, it nevertheless should be considered 
because the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances 
must rest with the State rather than with the defendant. 
*** 
[B]ecause it is the responsibility of the prosecution and the trial 
court, together viewed as the State, to try a defendant in a timely 
manner, some of the responsibility for the delay in bringing the 
case to trial must rest with the State. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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Second, the facts in State v. Livas, 144 Idaho 349, 160 P.3d 1284 (Ct. App. 2007), are 
distinguishable from the case at bar. The State's briefing cites extensively to State v. Livas. 
Reliance thereon is unavailing. In Livas, the Court of Appeals ruled that Livas' speedy trial 
rights were not violated because Livas himself was responsible for the delay. This was 
evidenced by the fact that Livas' counsel represented that Livas would be willing to waive 
speedy trial and the Court twice reset the trial date, presumably, to accommodate Livas' motion 
to suppress, supplemental briefing, and motion to reconsider. The same cannot be said of the 
circumstances in this case. Jacobson did nothing to cause the delay and the trial was never 
reset.6 The responsibility to bring Jacobson to trial in a timely fashion rested with the Court and 
the prosecution. Each failed in that regard. The consequences for such error fall squarely on the 
State. The only question is the degree to which this factor favors Jacobson. 
Third, as argued in Jacobson's Opening Brief, the degree to which the reason for the 
delay weighs in favor of Jacobson is significant. The facts here are somewhat peculiar since this 
is not a case where any justification has been offered as to why Jacobson could not be tried in six 
months. In such instances where court congestion and witness availability are non-factors, and 
against the backdrop of a defendant that twice demanded a speedy trial, the State's failure to 
6 To be sure, Jacobson filed a motion to suppress, but it had no effect on the trial date and 
the trial was never reset as a result. Accordingly, the facts of this case are less like Livas and 
more like State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 745 P.2d 1115 (Ct. App. 1987) (cited with approval in 
Clark, supra), wherein the Court stated that "The six month time limitation for speedy trial under 
I.C. § 19-3501 does not represent a whimsical timeframe. It is designed to accommodate a 
reasonable number of pretrial motions ... " 113 Idaho at 496, 745P.2dat 1117. 
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timely bring this case to adjudication is not slight, and should be weighed heavily against the 
State.7 
B. The State's argument regarding the timing of Jacobson's assertion of speedy trial rights is 
factually and legally incorrect 
The State further argues that dismissal is not warranted because Jacobson failed to object 
to the late trial setting "despite an opportunity to do SO.,,8 
First, the State's position is not supported by case law. The State's argument is a 
reference to the rulings in Lopez, Moore, and Rodriguez-Perez, in which the Court of Appeals 
stated that the invocation of speedy trial in those cases did not weigh in favor of the accused 
because the invocation suggested that the suspect wanted a dismissal and had no interest in 
having a speedy trial. The specific factual context in the above cases was a delayed and belated 
demand for a speedy trial. The facts in those cases are nothing like those in the instant matter. 
For example, in Lopez, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Lopez did not assert his right to speedy trial until he filed his 
motion to dismiss on October 4, 2005, two days before the date 
ultimately set for trial. He at no time requested a more expeditious 
trial. The lateness of Lopez's assertion of his speedy trial right 
weighs heavily against his contention that the right was violated. 
That is, the timing of a defendant's assertion of the right tends to 
disclose whether a defendant actually desired a speedy trial, and is 
closely related to and affects other Barker factors, including 
prejudice and reasons for the delay. Here, the late assertion of the 
right weighs significantly against Lopez in balancing the speedy 
trial factors. 
7 Considering the factual circumstances under which the delay occurred is appropriate as 
this Court has itself stated that "[T]he reason for the delay cannot be evaluated entirely in a 
vacuum ... " State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 899, 231 P.3d 532, 544 (Ct. App. 2010). 
8 Respondent Brief, P. 9. 
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State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007). Similarly, in Moore, 
the Court of Appeals stated the following: 
Here, Moore did not assert his speedy trial rights until 
approximately sixteen months after he was arrested for 
misdemeanor DUI-and even after that he took nearly four months 
to file his brief on the motion and later requested that a scheduled 
trial date be vacated ... Thus, we must conclude here that Moore's 
failure to assert his speedy trial rights until sixteen months after his 
arrest is a factor that weighs against dismissal on speedy trial 
grounds. 
State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 902-03, 231 P.3d 532, 547-48 (Ct. App. 2010). Likewise, in 
State v. Rodriguez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 921 P.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1996), this Court again reached 
the same conclusion: 
Defense counsel's first expression of concern about the trial date 
was Mr. Morris's February 11, 1994, oral request for an early trial 
setting. This was more than ten months after Rodriquez-Perez's 
arrest. Rodriquez-Perez's first unequivocal invocation of speedy 
trial guarantees occurred when he filed his motion to dismiss on 
April 28, 1994, some eleven days before the scheduled trial. The 
defendant's assertion of his rights at a relatively late point in the 
proceedings does not weigh in favor of dismissal under the Barker 
balancing process. 
129 Idaho at 37,921 P.2d at 214. 
In stark contrast to the above cases, here, Jacobson demanded a speedy trial at the earliest 
possible moment and again demanded a speedy trial soon thereafter. Based on the foregoing 
excerpts, the State has cited a rule outside of the factual context in which it has been applied by 
this Court. The State's admonition that Jacobson is to blame for the delay to which he was 
subjected is not supported by the law. 
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Second, it is highly improper to attempt to shift the blame for the delay to Jacobson. Our 
appellate courts have made it crystal clear that the Court and prosecution have an explicit duty to 
bring defendants to trial in a timely fashion. See e.g. Livas, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289 
("The duty to bring a defendant to trial lies with the State, not the defendant. The prosecution 
and the trial court have the primary burden to ensure that cases are brought to trial in a 
timely manner") (emphasis added); See also Stuart, 113 Idaho at 497, 745 P.2d at 1117 ("Trial 
courts must be diligent in securing compliance with time restraints. It is the court's duty to 
arrange for trial") (emphasis added). 
While Jacobson did not formally object to the late trial setting, it seems somewhat absurd 
to argue that Jacobson is somehow at fault for, inter alia, not demanding a third speedy trial after 
the State was twice put on notice ofthe demand. Additionally, and as stated, it is the State's duty 
to bring Jacobson to trial - not Jacobson's to repeatedly ensure that the State is acting in 
accordance with the law. It is hard to conceive that Jacobson could have made the State more 
aware of Jacobson's desire to be tried in a timely fashion. The error rests with the State and the 
consequences therefor must likewise be borne by the State. In short, because it is the State's 
duty to bring the Defendant to trial in a timely fashion, and not Jacobson's responsibility to 
ensure that the government is doing its job, the State must bear the blame, especially when 
Jacobson twice requested a speedy trial. 
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C. It is the State's burden to prove prejudice and, in any event, any lack of prejudice 
suffered by Jacobson is insufficient to get around the additional factors the Court is to 
consider 
The State argues that Jacobson was not prejudiced by the "two and one-half week jury 
trial delay.,,9 The State further asserts that "Jacobson has not asserted any other specific 
prejudice from the short delay."l0 These arguments lack merit. 
First, the State's position ignores the fact that under I.C. § 19-3501, the State bears the 
burden of proving "good cause" and the factual underpinnings that comprise such a finding. 
Moore, 148 Idaho at 899, 231 at 544 ("When a defendant who invokes his statutory speedy trial 
rights is not brought to trial within six months and shows that trial was not postponed at his 
request, the burden then shifts to the state to demonstrate good cause for the court to 
decline to dismiss an action") (emphasis added). Here, the State has not proven a lack of 
prejudice. As stated in Jacobson's Opening Appellant Brief: 
The burden of proving good cause is on the State and the State did 
not prove that Jacobson was not prejudiced. It is the State's 
burden to prove prejudice not Jacobson's burden to disprove the 
same ... Because it is the State's burden to prove good cause, the 
State should be forced to point to specific facts indicating lack of 
prejudice. It should thus not matter that a defendant initially did 
not come forward with evidence of actual prejudice. If the law 
were otherwise, defendants seeking to dismiss a case under 
I.C. § 19-3501(4) would effectively have the burden of disproving 
that which it was never their burden to prove in the first place. I I 
9 Respondent's Brief, P. 9. 
10 Respondent's Brief, P. 9. 
II Appellant's Opening Brief, P. 15-16. 
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Second, even assuming Jacobson was not prejudiced to a significant degree and that the 
reason for the delay was neutral, this should not change the outcome of the case. The crucial 
facts of this matter compel reversal of Judge Watkins, irrespective of where this Court falls on 
the prejudice issue. By way of recall: 
(a) Jacobson twice invoked his speedy trial rights (Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d 
at 936 ("[I]f the defendant has demanded a speedy trial .,. a stronger reason is necessary to 
constitute good cause"); See also Moore, 148 Idaho at 902, 231 P.3d at 547 (A defendant's 
assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial is "entitled to strong evidentiary weight III 
detennining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right") (citations omitted); 
(b) Jacobson invoked his speedy trial rights at the earliest possible moment in the 
proceedings (State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 353, 160 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2007)) ("[T]he 
timing of a defendant's assertion of the right tends to disclose whether a defendant actually 
desired a speedy trial, and is closely related to and affects other Barker factors, including 
prejudice and reasons for the delay"); 
(c) the reason for the delay was Court error, as admitted thereby, and Jacobson did 
nothing to cause or precipitate any delay in the proceedings (State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 
627, 38 P.3d 1275, 1287 (Ct. App. 2001)) ("The ultimate responsibility for the delay must rest 
with the government rather than with the defendant"); 
(d) no continuances were requested and no speedy trial waivers were executed; and 
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(e) the prosecution offered no excuse or justification, whether legitimate or not, as to 
why it was unable to bring Jacobson to trial in Custer County within six months of his first not 
guilty plea or even within six months of Jacobson's second not guilty plea, via counsel. 
Against this backdrop, an alleged lack of prejudice or Court negligence should not be 
enough to tip the balance ofthis case in favor of the State. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Jacobson respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM Judge Roos's Order of Dismissal 
and REVERSE Judge Watkins' Memorandum Decision Re: Appeal and Order Re: Appeal. 
DATED this I!~ay of February, 2012. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
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